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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SINGAPORE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM: DOES IT 




 In this paper, we  briefly describe the  institutional background to Singapore’s 
successful national  skills development model. We devise a tentative framework to 
evaluate national level skills development efforts, and we use it to assess the Singapore 
model. We argue that the model has the potential to constantly move towards higher 
skills equilibria, and in those terms, it is successful. However, we  question the long-term 
sustainability of the model, and whether it is transferable to other developing nations. We 
outline several useful principles that other nations might use in organizing their own 
skills development systems 
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Improving the national skill set is clearly an important policy issue for all 
countries.  There is a large literature, for example, pointing to a strong relationship 
between investments in human capital and economic growth (e.g.,  Romer, 1986; Lucas 
1988; Solow 1956; Azariades and Drazen 1991), while trade theories (e.g. the Hekscher-
Ohlin model) stress the quality of national human resources as a critical factor in 
determining comparative advantage (e.g. Wood, 1994; Godfrey, 1997).  The need to 
improve the quality of human resources is particularly important for developing nations, 
given its importance in the attraction of  foreign direct investment (Koike, 1996; 
Kuruvilla, 1997).  And although the developing world accounts for a steadily increasing 
share of  world manufacturing (partly driven by lower wages and costs in that world), 
competitive advantage based on low wages is inherently a transitory phenomenon: sooner 
or later, developing countries will face the need to "upskill" as other lower cost producers 
emerge. 
 The aim of this paper is to assess the Singapore skills development system 
(hereafter SSDS) and to examine its potential to be a model for developing nations.1  
Singapore is the best known example of a nation that has successfully and continuously 
upskilled its workforce over the last 40 years. The skills development system surely 
contributes to Singapore's consistent top rankings in comparative surveys of human 
resource development.2 And the Singapore system, which is anchored and run by the 
government in collaboration with the private sector, appears to debunk the conventional 
wisdom that governments are notoriously poor at organizing and administering skills 
development, particularly on a national scale. In fact, it seems to provide a rare, but  good 
example of a concerted national effort involving collaboration between private sector and 
government (Singh 1990).  Yet, there has been no systematic assessment of the system. 
 To assess the system (given the absence of  established frameworks for evaluation 
of national skills development efforts),  we develop a framework that focuses on focuses 
on institutional pre-requisites, linkages to other institutions, the degree to which the 
private sector is involved, and  the process by which the system works.  We also 
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specifically examine the issue of long-term sustainability of the system, and its potential 
for being a model for developing nations.  
      
  
2. KEY FEATURES OF THE SINGAPORE SYSTEM OF SKILLS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 We briefly highlight the main features of the SSDS (for a more detailed 
explication of the system see Kuruvilla and Chua 2000, and Ashton et. al. 1999).  
(a) Structure 
 
 Broadly speaking, and as the system exists currently (the structures and 
institutions have changed considerably over-time, and as we shall argue, the frequent 
changes are also an important ingredient in the success of the system), there are several 
key actors and institutions. Perhaps the most important institution is the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry (MITI), which is responsible for broad economic development policies 
(Ashton et al, 1999).  Supporting the Ministry are a range of semi-autonomous agencies, 
one of which is the Economic Development Board (EDB), an agency that has the primary 
function of attracting foreign direct investment and meeting foreign investors’ demands 
for the required skilled personnel. This linkage is important in and of itself (economic 
development and skills) but the EDB has also worked  together with other agencies, such 
as the Productivity and Standards Board, the Institute Technical Education, and other 
industry-specific bodies such as the Precision Engineering Institute, to meet the skills 
demands of investors over the years.  
 A second key institution in the SSDS is the Council for Professional and 
Technical Education (CPTE), an independent body that takes overall responsibility for 
matching the demand and supply for skills in the economy.  Based on existing levels and 
estimated future needs, this body works together with different parts of the education 
system (universities, polytechnics and schools) and skills development institutions 
(Institute of Technical Education, Productivity and Standards Board, and other industry 
specific training institutes) to ensure the supply of sufficient numbers of workers with the 
desired level of skills for industry requirements.  The CTPE serves the all-important 
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coordination functions, gathering the required information to provide targets for several 
other agencies. A third key actor is the Ministry of Education which has direct 
jurisdiction over schools, polytechnics, universities and the Institute of Technical 
Education.   
 In general, the EDB focuses on skills for  economic development through the 
focus on meeting investors’ skills needs, the CTPE focuses on overall coordination, and 
the Ministry of Education focuses on long term human resource development, while a 
range of other institutions focus on short and medium term skills needs, notably 
vocational skills. These include various vocational training institutions, such as the 
Institute for Technical Education, and various other industry-specific institutes. Finally, 
the Productivity and Standards Board (PSB) focuses on productivity improvements in 
different industries and firms, and points those firms to appropriate skills training 
institutions.  In this way, the government helps firm-level skills development. The PSB 
thus focuses on workers who are already in the workforce, while other institutions focus 
on those about to enter (or re-enter) the workforce.  
 An important aspect of the SSDS, as Ashton et al (1999) noted, are the channels 
of communication across different institutions. These channels of communication exist at 
different levels in the SDSS, and include high level official inter-ministry and inter-
agency meetings among bodies such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Economic 
Development Board, and the Council for Professional and Technical Education.  MITI 
representatives also sit on various boards and councils in the range of higher education 
and training institutions to ensure that workforce skills demands can be translated into 
meaningful goals in these institutions at the operational level.  On the supply side, the 
Ministry of Education, higher educational institutions and worker training and upgrading 
institutions also participate in feedback on their existing capacity and observed trends 
while working together with CPTE in identifying areas that have to be addressed to meet 
estimated future needs.   As an example, corporate training through PSB programs can be 
funded by the Skills Development Fund, a levy system administered by the EDB, with 
both agencies working together to ensure that skills training is easily accessible to 
workers.  In addition to this multi-level inter-locking system of communication and 
interactions in the SSDS, the Boards of Management of each of these institutions is 
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tripartite in nature (representation by employers, government and labor unions), which 
ensures that different interests are heard and permits the development of a national 
consensus.  
A pictorial depiction of the primary  structure is provided in Figure 1.   This 
figure does not purport to be an indication of organizational structure but more an 
indication of where the different institutions are positioned in relation to economic and 
developmental needs of the country. The solid lines indicate reporting relationships while 
the broken lines indicate instances where there is coordination and communication 
between the parties. The broken lines do not adequately reflect the degree and nature of 
institutional cooperation, however, and this aspect is discussed later in this paper. 
 
(b). The Linkage between Economic Development Strategies and Skills Development. 
  
  Kuruvilla and Chua (2000) noted the tight “coupling” between economic 
development strategies in Singapore and its skills development policies. Tracing 
Singapore’s economic development through each of its four main stages of economic 
development,  they showed how the state was able to mold its national human resource 
policy to provide the skills necessary for each phase of development.  During the import 
substitution industrialization period (1959-1965), the national imperative was to have a 
standardized education system that not only provided the science, math, and technical 
education required for economic development, but one that also aimed to ensure that 
ethnic roots and values were not eroded through the focus on basic literacy and 
technology requirements.  A pragmatic expression of this philosophy was the option of 
schools that use an ethnic language, such as Chinese, Malay or Hindi, as the main 
medium of instruction while also requiring English to be taught.  There were also schools 
that used English as the main medium of instruction with the ethnic language as a 
required second language.  Therefore, bilingualism was a key part of the curriculum. The 
short-term needs for trained technicians were met through a series of secondary 
vocational institutions and polytechnics. Managerial training during this phase was 
provided by the manpower development unit of the Economic Development Board, the 
agency that was established in 1961 and given the responsibility for addressing industry 
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needs of the economy. The results show that primary and secondary school enrolment 
increased by 33% and 93% during this period, while college enrolment increased by 
69%. The new polytechnics graduated around 1200 workers during this period.  
 The import-substitution phase of the economic development cycle was followed 
by an export-oriented industrialization phase from 1966 to 1973.  With this new 
development strategy, attracting foreign investment became the main focus of the 
government, as foreign investors bring along with them not only capital, but also 
technology and access to foreign markets. A key imperative of this phase was the need to 
meet demands for technically trained manpower for these foreign investments. While an 
early step to meet the demand for higher skilled personnel was through the establishment 
of local training institutions that focused on technical skills (e.g., the Singapore Technical 
Training Institute to train instructors for other vocational institutions), the EDB also 
realized the importance of technology transfers from institutions in more advanced 
countries.  As a result, the EDB commenced funding overseas training for selected 
workers through its overseas training scheme. This was complemented by the EDB’s 
initial articulation of its model of skills and technology transfer (to be discussed below), 
where specific foreign corporations were provided finance and infrastructure to set up 
training centers in Singapore. These initiatives contributed to a large increase in technical 
education and the creation of 800 OTS training positions.  
 In Phase 3 (1973-1984) of Singapore’s economic development, the export 
oriented strategy moved into higher value-added and more technologically-advanced 
products that required both general skills (vocational and technical training for 
occupations such as fitters, electricians, welders) and specialized skills germane to the 
industries that were growing as a result of foreign investment. To facilitate this transition, 
there were three major government initiatives, largely through the EDB.  First, the 
Vocational and Industrial Training Board was established in 1979 to be the largest 
supplier of all general skills, through its jurisdiction over all existing technical, vocational 
and commercial training institutions. Second, the EDB intensified its model of 
technology transfer for meeting specific skills, by inducing foreign companies to take the 
initiative in training with training subsidies and grants. And third, the education system 
was also reformed, culminating in the NES (new educational system), which is described 
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in greater detail below. In essence, however, the new educational system, akin to the 
German model, provides for the supply of both technical and vocational students as well 
as those heading to the university.  This education reform was also buttressed by 
curricular reform at the National University of Singapore, and was coupled with the 
creation of the Nanyang Technological University as well as two new polytechnics, 
making a total of four polytechnics in all. 
 In the most recent phase of economic development since the mid-1980s, the 
preoccupation has been with enhancing creativity among the young and with developing 
entrepreneurial risk-taking behavior. This transition is perhaps the most challenging, as 
creativity and entrepreneurial risk-taking behavior requires a huge change in attitude for 
individuals to take personal responsibility for ideas and direction rather than for the state 
to set an orderly pace of development for its people.  While part of the rationale for this 
new focus is that it is the next natural economic developmental move towards becoming a 
major investment force in the region, this new focus also reflects an attempt to respond to 
industry feedback that Singapore graduates were analytically sound and could execute 
well-defined tasks, but were often stymied when problems and instructions were not clear 
or when faced with situations that demanded innovativeness and creativity (Kuruvilla and 
Chua, 2000).  
(c) The FDI, Skills, and Technology Transfer Model 
Perhaps the most important and unique feature of the SSDS has been to provide 
incentives for foreign investors to establish training centers in collaboration with the 
state, while guaranteeing the foreign investors the rights to hire a proportion of the 
graduates from these training centers. This ensures that foreign investors will not face 
skill shortages in a tight labor market, given that they have some control over the supply 
of skilled people.  
The model initially started on a small scale where the Economic Development Board 
targeted specific companies such as Rollei (Germany), Phillips (Netherlands) and Tata 
(India). The incentives offered to the different companies varied.  For example, the EDB 
provided Rollei with several major incentives to invest in Singapore and establish its 
training center. It granted Rollei the right of refusal for a period of 10 years: i.e., during 
this period the wide range of products that Rollei could make was placed under a "control 
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of manufacture ordnance" which required all other potential manufacturers of the same 
products to seek a license to produce them in Singapore (Kuruvilla and Chua, 2000). 
Such a license would be granted only if Rollei declined to manufacture these items in 
Singapore. In the Tata case, the government provided loan finance to the group to set up 
their business, reasonable land rents, and paid for the purchase of training equipment and 
materials, as well as 70% of  operating costs.   
These centers were organized on similar lines, however. The principle was that the 
companies offering the training would have the right to hire the graduates. For example, 
44% of the Rollei institute graduates were employed by Rollei and other German firms. 
Another significant feature was that the EDB participated in the management of these 
centers, sometimes taking them over after some years, or integrating these centers with 
the existing vocational training apparatus in Singapore.   
With the success of these individual centers in the early 1980s, and the need for a 
much higher flow of skills given the higher levels of foreign investment, the EDB 
expanded its focus to create training centers funded jointly by other governments and 
itself. The logic here was that if foreign governments could be persuaded to invest in 
skills development in Singapore, that would be an important incentive for firms from that 
foreign country to also invest in Singapore. Accordingly, The Japan-Singapore 
Government Training Center (specializing in metal machining, electrical fitting, 
electronics instrumentation), The German-Singapore Institute for production Technology, 
the French-Singapore Institute for Electro-technology, and the Japan-Singapore Institute 
of Software technology were established during the 1979-1984 period. The operating 
principles were similar to the individual company centers. There was some degree of cost 
sharing by the two governments, the expertise and training materials were provided by 
the investing companies and governments, and companies from those countries were 
guaranteed that their demands for graduates would be met.             
 With continued economic growth and the need for a larger supply of skilled 
craftsmen and technicians, several of these institutes were later combined to form much 
larger institutions. Kuruvilla and Chua (2000) describe the Institute for Precision 
technology (PEI), for example, created out of the erstwhile Rollei institute, which itself 
was taken over by the Brown-Boveri government training center following the collapse 
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of Rollei-Werke in Germany. The  PEI was run by the government, but with many 
foreign firms as partners; the staff and instructors were trained at the various companies 
abroad, and included within it several different centers such as the Siemens Nixdorf-EDB 
center for Advanced die and Tool making, the Bridgeport-EDB Computer numerical 
control library, and the Mitutyo-EDB Metrology laboratory. Similarly, The German-
Singapore Institute was transformed into a full computer industry training center, with 
firms from several countries participating to create a fully integrated center servicing the 
needs of the computer industry.  
 This model of cost sharing with foreign investors and the Singapore government 
(through the EDB) was successful not only at generating the skills required for foreign 
investors in the short-run, but also served as centers of training for future transferable 
skills (or, general human capital) as well, by harnessing different foreign firms' unique 
expertise. Thus, the German-Singapore institute became an industry training center, with 
world leaders in several different technologies providing training. And, Japanese 
electronics companies such as Seiko, Sankyo Deiki, Matsushita and Mitutyo provided 
expertise in surface mount technology, IC design, and computer numerical control 
technology; European companies such as Siemens, Asea, and Carl Zeiss contributed 
equipment and skills in the areas of artificial intelligence, laser and vision technology; 
and Hewlett Packard and Auto Desk provided training and expertise in CAD/CAM 
robotics and simulation software. This training centers model was soon expanded to 
several other industries as well 
 While there is evidence (Vente and Chow, 1984) to suggest that these institutes 
have been crucial in meeting the demand for skills, this is also an example of a 
government being able to play a leading role in providing incentives to foreign investors 
to invest in skills development in a way that benefits both foreign companies and the 
home-country workers.  It also demonstrates the potential value of linking national 
economic development policy to skills development policy.  
(d) The Skills Development Fund. 
 
The Skills Development Fund System (SDF) represents the government's efforts 
to encourage all firms to invest in skills development. Enacted in 1984, the legislation 
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requires employers to contribute 1% of gross salary of all employees earning less than 
1000 S$ per month (revised upward to $1500 in July 2000) into the skills development 
fund. They can recoup 80% of their contribution by requesting training grants for skills 
development. The training grants are structured such that firms providing training in 
skills that are in demand, or have training plans that cover over 50% of the workforce, are 
provided higher sums, while companies that continue to use low skilled workers in low 
cost operations are penalized. Firms can apply for these grants electronically, through a 
system called Skillsnet, and as a further incentive to invest in skills, National Training 
Awards are given to companies that do particularly well in terms of workforce training. 
By 1990, roughly 30% of the workforce had undergone some kind of training under this 
system, and the average training expense of corporations was about 2.4% of total payroll 
costs. By 1996, roughly 33% of the workforce was receiving training, and corporations 
were spending 3.6% of their payroll on training.  
(e) Long Term Skills Development: Education Policy 
 While the EDB has been focusing on ensuring that skills are available for 
economic development, the Council for Professional and Technical Education (CPTE) 
has established specific targets and policies for the various components of the education 
and training system, notably the universities, polytechnics, and schools. In 1979, the 
Ministry of education undertook a sweeping review of education and proposed the NES 
(the new education system) at the school level. The new education system emphasized six 
years of primary education (with a major focus on math, science, and English), four years 
of secondary education during which students are channeled into arts, commerce, science, 
and technical streams, followed by the comprehensive British based General Certificate 
of Education – Ordinary Level (commonly referred to as the GCE "O" level) 
Examinations, which would qualify students for junior college, then the GCE – Advanced 
Level Examination (GCE “A” Level) to qualify for university. The two common 
examinations (GCE “O” and GCE “A”) aimed for a consistent standard, and students 
who did not pass these examinations were channeled into the vocational training area to 
the various institutes described earlier.  Coupled with the NES, there were major 
curriculum changes  at the university level, particularly in engineering,  to ensure that 
long-term technical skills were produced.  
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Since the 1990s, education policy has been rethought again, to focus on increasing 
creativity in school children.  This is being attempted through changes in the structure of 
examinations, more project based methods of evaluation, more research and term papers, 
and other methods to encourage students to "think outside the box."  The thinking skills 
program launched by the Prime Minister in 1996 was designed to address the perception 
that Singapore graduates are analytically sound, but lack creativity, based on feedback 
from industry.  Education and curriculum reform was also deemed necessary given 
Singapore's goal of becoming a regional research and development center, and the 
estimated shortfall in the number of research scientists and engineers. The goal of 
becoming a "knowledge economy" continues to motivate questioning of the education 
system. The Ministry of Education (MOE) is targeting 5 areas for redesign and 
improvement in the coming years:  1.  Conducive school environment, 2.  Curriculum 
and assessment system,  3.  Teacher development,  4. Pre- and post-school education,  
and 5. Developing Singapore as an education hub. In line with this drive, the labor 
organization, The National Trade Union Congress (NTUC), also proposed Productivity 
Action 21 (ProAct 21), a program of learning and upgrading to keep its members 
employable throughout their working lives.  Thus, the continuous learning culture is 
being operationalized through different public agencies, both government and labor 
organizations.  These initiatives are still in their early stages, however. 
(f) Summary 
 The key features described above are suggestive of a system where there is a 
strong degree of centralized articulation and planning of skills development needs, 
coupled with an innovative government-private sector partnership that integrates foreign 
direct investment and technology transfer in ways that provide necessary skills on 
relatively short notice. Further, the SDF works to ensure that firms continually invest in 
skills formation and upgradation, while the education system has been frequently  re-






 3. ASSESSING THE SINGAPORE SYSTEM OF SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 
 
How should the SSDS be assessed?   At the outset, we must admit that we know 
of no established framework or heuristic that permits a complete assessment of the SSDS.  
And, our questions to various Singapore government officials yielded little in terms of a 
consistent framework that they use to assess how the SDSS is performing. Officials seem 
to take a problem-oriented view in their assessment of the system: i.e., if they hear of or 
perceive problems, they react to them, but in general, they appear to rely on broad and 
general developmental, labor market, and educational indicators, whose connection to 
specific skills development needs were at times tenuous at best. 
(a) General Indicators 
 Several broad and general indicators have been used by policy makers to evaluate 
the overall success of skills formation and development policies.  These include the 
general level of economic growth, the extent of foreign direct investment, the degree to 
which exports are composed of higher value added items, the degree to which there are 
skills mismatches generally, and the rates of growth of productivity (both nationally and 
disaggregated by industry). Different agencies place different weights on some of these 
measures ---economic growth and FDI, for example, are of greater concern to the EDB, 
while increase in value added exports and productivity growth are of greater importance 
to the PSB. Similarly, the average annual growth rates of graduates is a key general 
statistic for universities and vocational institutions (see Table 1).  
 The macro data in Table 1 appear to indicate the success of skills development 
efforts in Singapore. Economic growth rates have been high, consistently among the 
highest in the region.  Foreign direct investment has also grown, also to the highest in 
ASEAN. Perhaps most importantly, annual average growth rates in productivity are high, 
much higher than most countries in the world.  We could not find longitudinal data on the 
composition of  exports, but we note that the value added per worker rose from S$ 42000 
to S$ 83000 in the manufacturing sector during 1988-1998, while corresponding figures 
for the service sector increased from S$ 52000 to S$ 92700 (Singapore 1998 Statistical 
Highlights).  
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-- Table 1 here -- 
 One overall measure that is occasionally used to evaluate the success of training 
at the national level is data on skill mismatches. This is most commonly measured by 
comparing the unemployment rate with the job vacancy rate, although many countries 
have more specific data on skills mismatches. The implicit assumption here is that if 
labor market institutions are effective and labor market information is transparent, it 
should be possible to convert those unemployed to fill the vacant jobs, controlling for 
other determinants of unemployment. This data for  1996-1999 is shown below in Table 
2.  These data are not easily interpretable, given that the Asian financial crisis had 
impacted Singapore during this period. Hence, unemployment rates were much lower 
than job vacancy rates in 1996 and 1997, but higher than job vacancy rates in 1998 and 
1999. Further, the large number of older workers who have been retrenched and are 
perhaps not capable of being retrained will also affect these figures.  The figures do show 
an improvement in 2000, however.  
-- Table 2 HERE --  
Although subject to many reservations, the data from Tables 1 and 2 suggest some 
support for the general success of Singapore's skills development efforts. Below, we turn 
to more specific indicators.  
 
(b) Performance of Specific Components 
  
Studies of the effectiveness of  particular training systems or programs or 
particular education systems are common in the literature (See, for example, Bishop 
1997; Keep and Mayhew 1999).  This approach can be utilized in the Singapore case as 
well, with separate investigations as to how the core institutions and programs work. We 
will focus here on some of the key components, notably, the education system, the skills 
development system, and some vocational training institutions.   
 It is worth noting that there are  several different ways in which education systems 
are evaluated. Commonly, measures of quality and quantity are used. Quality measures 
focus on comparative performance, such as the international comparison of  scores on 
certain subject related tests. In this measure, a high relative test score is presumed to 
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indicate a better education system. The best known of such measures is the third 
international math and science study, conducted on a group of 13 year olds from several 
Western and Asian countries. Singapore students stood first in both science and math 
(Beaton, 1996).  In another study of 18 year olds, Singapore students stood second in 
chemistry and physics and first in biology. By these measures of relative achievement, 
therefore, the Singapore education system performs extremely well.3
Measures of quantity (or the output of the education system) even more unambiguously 
suggest effectiveness of the system. Table 3 presents a picture of the Singapore 
workforce in terms of the distribution of education for the years 1990 and 2000, while 
Table 4  shows the growth rate of output from the various academic institutions, 
including polytechnics, vocational training institutes and courses from the Productivity 
and Standards Boards.  
-- Tables 3 and 4 HERE --  
 An alternate measure of the education and training system focuses on  
"sufficiency" and comes from the manpower requirements perspective. Viewed from this 
perspective, jobs and occupations have specific schooling requirements, and thus the 
occupational skill requirements are driven by forces such as consumer demand and 
technological change   The key question here is whether policies have been undertaken 
such that supply and demand are in equilibrium. If not, there is either undereducation 
(low supply of skilled workers), which creates a bottleneck to economic growth or an 
"overeducation" where individuals’ schooling and training exceed the amount that is 
presumed to be "required" for those jobs.  Although we do not have original data that 
would constitute an adequate test from the manpower requirements perspective, we do 
have access to surveys of international business executives regarding the Singapore 
workforce. These international competitiveness rankings are based on both objective 
assessments about the nation’s workforce quality, as well as subjective assessments by 
international executives. Table 5 shows Singapore's rankings on these dimensions. This 
table does not show relative improvement in skills development efforts (measured by 
perceptions of sufficiency relative to other countries  by the international business 
community), given the decline in Singapore's rank between 1988 and 2000.  
-- Table 5 HERE --  
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 The SDF's can be evaluated in terms of the total number of persons undergoing 
training, and over the years, this levy/grant system has ensured that roughly one out of 
three Singaporeans receives some training through SDF activities every year. An 
important indirect outcome of the SDF's, perhaps urged on by the National Training 
Award Scheme, is a gradual increase in the average corporate budget (as a percentage of 
payroll costs) for training, and this has increased from 1% of payroll in 1986 to 3.6 % of 
payroll in 1996. It remained at 3.6% during the 1996-2000 period (Table 6).  
-- Table 6 HERE --  
A key question is whether this investment in training has paid off in terms of 
increasing productivity.  Table 1 indicated that average levels of productivity growth 
were high in Singapore. There is also evidence to suggest that the industries that were the 
biggest investors in training (as per SDF figures) are also the most productive. Kuruvilla 
and Chua (2000) cite the example of the computer disk drive and peripherals industry, 
which has been the most intensive user of SDF, and the value added per worker in dollar 
terms is S $ 138000, about twice the average in comparable manufacturing firms. 
Similarly, value added in dollar terms has been very high in the transport and 
communications industry. However, there are inherent limitations of these measures in 
that they do not indicate whether training alone (and specifically SDF-sponsored training) 
is responsible for the productivity increases. In general however, as Bishop (1997) argues 
in his wide-ranging survey on employer provided training, there is an inherent difficulty 
in isolating the separate impact of firm level training on productivity growth.  
 The evaluation of individual components suggests that Singaporean institutions 
are effective, although it is not clear that there is a standard to judge them against. It 
would be more enlightening to be able to link changes in economic growth rates or 
changes in productivity growth rates to overall skills and education improvement, but 
such direct causal inferences are inherently problematic. 
 Thus, these summary measures of specific institutions are generally consistent 
with the picture that emerged from our discussion of broad macro economic measures. 
Each of the institutions we examined performs well on measures of quantity, while 
external evaluations of the quality of Singapore's labor force are high on some 
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dimensions, but declining (in terms of the competitiveness rank) in terms of whether the 
skills of the workforce are sufficient for its current needs. 
 
( c )   Progress towards High Skills Equilibria 
  
However, sufficient current functioning does not guarantee that these institutions 
will function effectively in the future, nor does it guarantee that skills development 
efforts in Singapore will continue to be adequate. What is necessary is some indication of 
whether the Singapore skills development model is capable of adapting continuously.  To 
assess potential, and we rely on the approach suggested by Finegold and Soskice (1988) 
to inquire into the capacity of the Singapore system to move to ever higher skills 
equilibria (see Culpepper 1999 for an example of its application to the German system).   
The basic underlying tenet of this approach is that continual development requires 
movement into higher skills equilibria (HSE). For countries to constantly attain higher 
skills equilibria, there are certain institutional prerequisites that are necessary. Our 
approach is to  examine whether Singapore shows evidence of these institutional pre-
requisites. Having the institutional pre-requisites does not, of course, guarantee that 
movement into higher skills equilibria will be made; the skills development institutions 
also have to function effectively, which the evidence reviewed above suggests is the case 
in Singapore.   
This approach has the advantage of more universal application, however, without 
getting bogged down in the measurement of the efficacy of individual components or  
institutions. One can easily compare across countries as to whether the pre-requisites 
exist, and if they do, then those nations possess the potential to evolve into states of 
higher skills equilibrium. The framework is more silent however, on the process through 
which an entire integrated national skills development system works, which is also a 
question in which we are interested in terms of assessment.  Yet, it is important to see 
whether Singapore does have the necessary preconditions for HSE. 
Finegold and Soskice’s (1988) perspective argues that movement to HSE requires 
that institutional and market conditions favor action on the part of different actors in the 
system. Individuals, for example, must be willing to invest more in education and 
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training, firms must be constantly motivated to increase employee skills, and 
governments must have motivation to ensure that there are no skills shortages. This 
action is influenced by both institutional conditions as well as market conditions.  
The three institutional and market pre-requisites that Finegold and Soskice 
emphasize include:  
a) Factors that force actors to take a long-term outlook (mostly institutions that counter 
pressures from capital markets to focus on the short-term). 
b) Factors that encourage interfirm cooperation within a competitive environment. 
c) Export orientation, or exposure to international competition. 
We analyze Singapore with reference to each of these pre-requisites. With regard 
to the presence of a long term outlook, Finegold and Soskice's argument is that 
competitive capital markets prevent firms from taking longer-term decisions given the 
more short term focus on the bottom line.  Although capital markets in Singapore are 
competitive and exert the same pressures, we argue that there are three other factors that 
encourage the adoption of a longer-term view with respect to skills development.  First, 
we argue that that a tight labor market in Singapore forces employers to take a longer-
term perspective with respect to retention and training of employees.  Singapore has been 
at full employment levels for the last two decades, and imports both skilled and unskilled 
labor. While such tightness could result in considerable turnover (as, for example, in 
Silicon Valley of California),  real turnover rates in Singapore are low and have declined 
in the 1990s (see Table 7)4.   We argue that this has resulted from employers’ incentives 
to retain employees, and an institutional/cultural setting that discourages poaching and 
job-hopping.  
-- Table 7 HERE --  
Second, we argue that there is some institutionalized encouragement of job 
security through labor union activity, and macro-level tripartite agreements (such as the 
mechanisms put in place during the Asian financial crisis; see Erickson and Kuruvilla 
2000) that limit the ability of firms to layoff and retrench freely.   In particular, the 
government plays an important role here. From the perspective of the government, the 
long term plans that are a basic feature of Singapore's government are built around a 
consensus between politicians, civil servants, business and labor, such that the long term 
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planning process is not derailed for the short term needs of one of the actors. This is one 
of the benefits of the tripartite structure of Singaporean industrial relations. Third, we 
argue that individuals also invest in more education and training largely because there is, 
in Finegold and Soskice's terms, a well defined high status structure of qualifications, 
where success is measured by qualifications, position and income and there is a clear 
return to education.  Thus, there are significant pressures for actors to take a longer-term 
perspective.  
 With regard to the second pre-requisite,  the existence of cooperation in a 
competitive environment, Finegold and Soskice's argument is that firms need to 
cooperate in the provision of training and skills development. Failure to cooperate has 
serious consequences, notably that firms would feel that if they invest in training, other 
firms will "poach" the employee, a condition that is more likely to happen in tight labor 
markets, ceteris paribus. In Singapore, despite its tight labor market, there is considerable 
cooperation among firms in the provision of skills.  This cooperation among firms is 
largely a result of government initiatives, particularly through the EDB's model of 
technology transfer and skills development, which brought together firms initially 
through collaborative training centers organized by the government and other 
governments, to industry wide training centers operated by the government where the 
private sector provided critical skills training to meet their own needs and the companies 
providing the training were guaranteed that the workers would not take their skills 
elsewhere in the near-term (see above). The incentives provided to firms to invest in 
training, and the government's own willingness to fund or  build the administrative 
apparatus for the delivery of skills to the entire industry, are of critical importance in the 
way in which government has fostered this cooperation. The government's role  here is 
similar to other examples of cooperation between competitive firms, such as in the Emilia 
Romagna region of Italy, where the local government set up industrial service centers for 
training to meet the needs of the firms.  Thus, there are institutional mechanisms that 
allow firms to cooperate and share information on the provision of skills for their 
industry. The Precision Engineering Institute in Singapore is one concrete example of the 
outcome of this institutional pre-requisite.   
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 Establishing such cooperative links between otherwise competitive firms are only 
part of the process of achieving a high skills equilibrium, however. Firms are generally 
not in a position to look at occupational needs across different sectors, a subject that is 
more in the bailiwick of state manpower planning departments. However, where there are 
macro-institutional forums for negotiations between the prime economic actors and 
government officials (corporatist institutions), the movement towards an HSE is critically 
enhanced.  Such corporatist institutions, argue Streeck and Schmitter (1985), are 
successful at forging a consensus among decisionmakers to shift investment and skills to 
high growth sectors, and to also deal with the pain of firm restructuring. Singapore 
perhaps is ideally placed with regard to this dimension, given its corporatist arrangement 
where labor through its links to the party forms the third  partner to government and 
business. An example of this is that the governing boards of all the major skills 
development institutions are tripartite in nature in Singapore.  
 At the firm level as well, there must be internally cooperative environments for 
continual innovation and change, particularly in order to motivate workers to gain new 
skills. The degree of cooperation internally largely depends on the type of labor-
management relations in firms, and the institutional features of the industrial relations 
system more generally. Firm-level labor-management relations are cooperative due to the 
enterprise union structure that the government has proscribed, in addition to various 
industrial relations regulations, such as legislation that limits the subjects of bargaining 
(job assignments, promotions, transfers, layoffs  are not bargainable), and administrative 
rules that circumscribe the right to strike (see Kuruvilla, 1996).  More general industrial 
relations harmony is achieved, as Kuruvilla (1996) notes, through the tripartite structure 
that is characteristic of Singapore, where unions have voice in national decision-making, 
coupled with a consistently high level of economic growth. The unified labor movement 
(97% of local unions are affiliated to one federation, the NTUC) also enhances tripartism.  
   The third critical institutional pre-requisite is the degree of exposure to 
international competition, which acts as an impetus to a high skill strategy  for the 
government, firms, and individuals.  Singapore's economic development since 1965 has 
been predicated on an export-oriented industrialization strategy. For the government, 
there has been the sense of a constant threat from other economies in Asia, initially from 
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South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and more recently from Malaysia, Philippines, 
China, and India. Singapore based firms are also exposed to international competition, 
and Singapore is a good example of  Katzenstein's (1985) argument that openness of an 
economy is positively correlated with the development of various institutional structures 
designed to attract high skill companies.   
 If having all of the  key prerequisites for the development of a high skills 
equilibrium is a useful way of assessing the SSDS, then Singapore seems to be a good 
example of a nation that has the capacity to constantly reach new levels of HSE. Thus, 
broad measures of outcomes suggest that the Singapore system is working, and the 
discussion on the prerequisites for HSE above suggests that Singapore has the capacity to 
move constantly into ever higher-skills equilibria. The key unanswered question concerns 
the HOW, i.e. the process by which success is generated, to which we turn next.   
 
( d ) Processes 
 
 We find that several factors play an important role with regard to the  HOW 
question and we draw heavily previous research (Kuruvilla and Chua 2000, Ashton et al 
1999), to identify important process dimensions 
Important dimensions include: the fact that it is a concerted national effort, which 
results in a unity of purpose that enables all the demand- and supply-side institutions to 
"speak with one voice;" a process that involves uncovering the different views of 
different institutions, discussions and iterative alignment of views to produce a unified 
direction; and finally, consistent actions by all the different parties toward maintaining 
the relevance of skills for industry. This constant effort in alignment of differences that 
leads to “speaking with one voice” inevitably flows over into changes in governmental 
agencies that have responsibility of implementing new plans and orders.  For example, 
the Productivity and Standards Board now has a wider ambit that includes quality 
standards and the Skills Development Fund, than when it started out as the National 
Productivity Board –which was primarily focused on productivity and skills training. The 
evolution of the various industry training institutes, such as the Precision Engineering 
Institute is another example.     Thus, the state and the various coordinating mechanisms 
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that we discussed earlier contribute to this highly integrated and complex interaction 
process.  By themselves, each of these bodies and interactions is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. However, when taken together, they enable effective functioning, as 
indicated below  
 Clearly, there is a concerted national effort here. The system operates at different 
levels, for instance. At the macro economic level, the CPTE sets overall direction for 
skills development through educational and training institutions. Through the 
Productivity and Standards Board, firms are constantly fed with productivity data to 
induce them to take advantage of the Skills Development Fund to train workers. The 
government works with the private sector to develop training centers and programs for 
the workers, and those workers are then hired by firms that provide the training. The 
training centers involve collaboration between different firms in the same industry. The 
state provides various incentives for corporations to invest in such training. Training is 
directly linked to foreign investment and economic development.    
 Relevance is maintained through various feedback loops. For instance, each 
training institution has ties with the private sector to obtain information and advice on the 
kind of training that is necessary. The Trade Advisory Council of the Industrial Technical 
Institute is made up of tripartite members while the SDF's have a tripartite advisory 
council. Since corporations help establish these training centers, they also have an interest 
in maintaining relevance. Relevance is further enhanced through the PSB's efforts at 
monitoring productivity growth throughout the economy. Finally, the fact that all of the 
different institutions work on the basis of a long-term economic development plan that is 
widely disseminated enables different departmental heads to see the wider relevance of 
what they are doing; it provides an underlying anchor  for their efforts. 
 A further extension of the relevance dimension concerns the constant 
consolidation and reorganization of institutions. For instance, The Institute for Technical 
Education, now the primary body for vocational training, actually has evolved through 
different structural forms, culminating in the merger of the Industrial Training Board, the 
Adult Education Board, and the Vocational and Industrial Training Board. The process of 
consolidation also enhances the diffusion of  skills training. In every case, the different 
centers established by the individual companies and governments were taken over by the 
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state. The state thus acquires ownership of the curriculum and ensures its further 
diffusion by distributing that curriculum throughout the web of  institutions.  
 Consolidation and reorganization also follows as a function of the need to 
collaborate with other institutions. For instance, when apprenticeship training needed to 
be improved in 1993, the PSB along with the SDF jointly launched the OJT 2000 plan 
that aimed to train 70,000 apprentices by the year 2000. Similarly, the PSB and the ITE 
have worked together to put in place a comprehensive system of continuing education for 
working adults without secondary school education.   
 Another aspect that clearly helps this synergy is the quality of leadership and 
organizational culture of different institutions.  Much has been written about the 
efficiency and organizational culture of Singapore bureaucrats; Schein (1996), in his 
study of the EDB, labels the culture one of strategic pragmatism. He argues that the 
Singapore bureaucracy has managed the development of teamwork on the one hand while 
simultaneously rewarding individual achievements. Our interviews with various skills 
development personnel also made it clear  that the nature and experience of leadership of 
the different institutions contributed substantially to the commonality of purpose 
throughout the system. Most leaders have rotated through several key policy positions in 
different institutions. Schein, for example points out that Ngiam Tong Dow, the chairman 
of the EDB from 1975-1981, previously  served as permanent secretary to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry, then served in the Ministry of Finance, and also as permanent 
secretary in the Prime Minister's office before becoming EDB chairman.  To take another 
example, Lim Boon Heng, currently head of the National Trades Union Congress, is also 
a Minister in the government, and functions as the Chairman of the Skills Development 
Fund Board., Previously, he served as the head of the Productivity and Standards board. 
Job rotation among top leaders, thus, also promotes the commonality of purpose. 
Our findings are consistent with those of Ashton et al. (1999), in  that the 
channels of communication across different state agencies are a key element in their 
success; yet, there is considerably more at work than the channels they suggest. Our 
findings are, also consistent with the observation made by Mark Daniels of Bain and 
Company (an international management consulting firm): " I think that the people who 
move into government are very well trained, very open minded and have an attitude 
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which is much akin to the private sector than you would find in a standard American or 
certainly European bureaucracy," and he also notes "there is an alignment of resources, 
the education system, the financing, the use of CPF funds, the government's policies, all 
aligned behind some well thought out and structured goals" (Kuruvilla and Chua 2000). 
 It is important to note that some of these key processes suggest prior design and 
intention (such as the job rotation among leaders, the structural links that facilitate 
common decisionmaking, and the collaboration across different agencies). But other 
processes have  evolved over time, (e.g., the  degree of consensus among civil servants 
about the broader economic goals of the country). More research is needed on these 
processes to tease out underlying constructs however.   
 
4. LONG TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF THE SINGAPORE SKILLS 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 
 
The SSDS seems to have worked well. The well known  well known argument of 
Young (1991) and Krugman(1994) that Singapore's growth has largely been driven by 
larger inputs of capital and labor rather than productivity growth may have been true for 
the pre-1996 period, but thereafter productivity growth in Singapore has been high, 
reaching almost 5.8% in 1999 (PSB  Annual report, 1999 Statistics).  The SSDS’ has also 
worked well during the Asian financial Crisis belying the argument of Ashton et al, (1999) 
that skills development works well during periods of high growth, but not during periods 
of low growth.  
 Our rationale, then, for posing the long-term sustainability question relates to the 
newly articulated long-term vision for the development of Singapore. The key question is 
whether the existing system of skills development is sufficient to meet the new goals.  
From what we have been able to gather, these still-developing long term goals amount to 
attempting to develop a culture of innovation so as to become a globally competitive 
knowledge economy and research and development hub, with Silicon Valley as a model.5  
In order to speculate about the future success of skills development in the light of 
these goals, we use Finegold's (1999) concept of "high skill ecosystems."    Finegold 
(1999) and Kenney (1999) have written about the factors that are important in the 
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creation of self sustaining high skills ecosystems (such as Silicon Valley, Cambridge 
(UK), the Boston Corridor, etc.).  
  Finegold (1999) uses a biological analogy to characterize the factors that help 
create a self sustaining high skills ecosystem; namely a catalyst, fuel or nourishment, a 
supportive host environment, and a high degree of interdependence for the separate 
organisms to grow.  We discuss the first three conditions with reference to Singapore.6  
 
(i) Catalysts: A key stimulant or catalyst in the growth of Silicon Valley was the 
large surge in department of defense funding in the 1940s and 1950s that helped create 
the cluster of aerospace firms in Southern California. The growth of Hewlett Packard and 
the links between Stanford and IT industry was yet another catalyst.  Research 
universities thus played a vital role for the development of HSE.  Singapore's universities 
are not similar to Stanford and Berkeley here in terms of either fundamental research or 
in incubating new high tech startups. Although government efforts at developing the 
infrastructure for the high technology industry are surely a "muscular" stimulus, 
universities also need to provide the "brain" stimuli.    
 
(ii) Nourishment:  Synergistic relationships between research universities and 
surrounding firms that hire their graduates become self-sustaining.  Thus steady intake of 
human capital needs to be coupled with availability of financial capital. While Singapore 
does turn out graduates, it is not clear that they turn out enough. Kuruvilla and Chua 
(2000) noted the government plan to boost the number of research scientists from 7900 in 
1986 to 13000 in 2000. However, it is also clear that much of this demand can only be 
met through immigration rather than self-generation. Secondly, Singapore does not have 
much of a class of venture capitalists.  
 
(ii) Supportive environment: These include basic infrastructure: transport and 
communications, science and technology parks, a climate that is attractive to knowledge 
workers (climate, cultural and leisure activities, schools, and being close to others like 
themselves), and a regulatory regime that supports innovation and risk-taking (low levels 
of regulations regarding working hours, relative ease in starting business, or taking 
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business public, and bankruptcy laws that do not penalize to a high degree).  Singapore's 
record is mixed on this dimension.  The basic infrastructure is very good, but it is not 
clear that Singapore does very well in terms of creating a climate that is attractive to 
knowledge workers, and it is not clear whether either regulations or social norms 
encourage risk-taking. One aspect that is often thought to be crucial to the attraction of 
knowledge workers is an extremely free society with a free press. Singapore has been 
known to be rather heavyhanded with those who criticize the government.  Further, the 
encouragement of entrepreneurial abilities requires both supportive legislation 
(bankruptcy laws) and a society in which failure is tolerated. Again, the extent to which 
this is true of Singapore is debatable.     
Thus, despite its current successes, Singapore’s government needs to contend with 
several fundamental issues about the nature of its society and democracy to facilitate this 
process. It is unclear as to whether Singapore's government-owned educational 
institutions can become like Stanford or the University of California, since it would 
require major changes in the universities, including autonomy, faculty management, 
teaching and research loads. It is not clear whether  the innovative environment exists, 
and although the government is mandating creativity in schools and college curriculums, 
creativity and innovation in business are a function of long term forces, including 
absolute democracy and freedom of expression and non controlled electoral systems. 
Further, innovation is also a function of the ability to fail, and it is not clear that society 
tolerates failure well in Singapore.  It is also not clear that a climate of free expression 
valued by knowledge workers currently exists.  There is a clear danger that  the reasons 
for the success of the Singapore system in the short term, particularly government 
orchestration, may not serve it so well in the long term.  
 
5. TRANSFERABILITY OF THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
 Since  rapid acceleration of skills development is a crucial imperative for many 
developing nations, successful systems like that of Singapore tend to b copied/adapted by 
other developing nations.  Key aspects of  Singapore’s context ( small size, tight labor 
markets, export orientation, the need to attract foreign investment) are also present in 
other developing nations.  Other developing nations may not have all the institutional 
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preconditions noted in Singapore. Further, the processes that Singapore has been able to 
put in place may not be easily replicated by other nations. 7. 
  What, then, are the lessons for other developing nations?  It is an increasingly 
accepted axiom in industrial relations that attempts at transplanting successful systems 
from one country to another is bound to result in failure (Katz, Kuruvilla and Turner, 
1993). Yet, several countries have shown interest in introducing the skills development 
system given its apparent success in Singapore. We would argue against transplantation, 
given that the  national integrated skills development system in Singapore is successful 
because it is part of a unique institutional context where different institutions work 
together in a coordinated way, with a commonality of purpose, and with linkages to a 
host of other policies  to deliver skills improvement.  And, the factors that have caused 
success here may not quite cause the same success elsewhere.  
 However, there is much that might be of use to other developing nations.  In 
particular we want to stress three major principles that might be applicable beyond 
Singapore’s borders. First,  the linkage (administratively and conceptually) between 
economic development and skills development. Second, the EDB's model of technology 
transfer, that takes advantage of the expertise of foreign investors to train local workers. 
Third, the fact that the private sector is induced to play a key role (in partnership with the 
government) both in terms of being part of the skills training process, but also in terms of 
training their own workforces. These three principles are important, and possibly 
transferable, although the specific institutions that other developing countries design to 
act on these principles may be very different.  
6.  CONCLUSION 
 Using a new framework we attempted to evaluate Singapore’s acclaimed skills 
development system.  We argued that the system is a good example of a concerted 
national integrated effort, since it involves private and public sectors, it occurs at multiple 
levels (educational institutions, vocational institutions, and within firms), it is linked to 
other national policies (e.g., economic development, technology transfer), and the various 
institutions appear to work together.  We concluded that the Singapore system works well 
for its current needs and exhibits the needed pre-requisites to transform into higher skills 
equilibria. We have raised some issues about the long term sustainability of the system in 
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the light of Singapore's own national plans for its future, noting in particular  the 
fundamental  changes that may be required if Singapore is to become another "Silicon 
Valley."  Finally, we argue that the Singapore system is not easily replicable in other 
nations for a variety of contextual and institutional reasons, but that there are important 
principles that may be transferable.  And although more research is necessary, we have 
also attempted to contribute to the development of a more general framework that can be 
used to evaluate national skills development efforts, since improving skills are so critical 
for developing nations.  
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Table 1: General Macro Indicators: Singapore, Selected Years.   
Year GDP 
Growth Rate 
Per Capita GDP 
at Current 













1965 6.6 1,567   60.2 
1970 13.4 2,798   68.9 
1975 4.0 5,941   76.2 
1980 9.7 10,394   82.3 
1985 -1.6 14,226    
1986 2.3 14,225 10.5   
1987 9.7 15,487 21.2   
1988 11.6 17,819 19.5 5.0 87.7 
1989 9.6 19,854 14.7  88.4 
1990 9.0 21,812 21.3  89.1 
1991 7.1 23,604 9.4  90.3 
1992 6.5 24,730 3.84  90.3 
1993 12.7 28,105 10.77 9.1 90.8 
1994 11.4 31,175 18.86 6.4 91.3 
1995 8.0 33,404 12.9 3.3 91.8 
1996 7.6 34,928 11.5 1.2 92.2 
1997 8.5 36,963 19.2 2.2 92.8 
1998 0.1 35,040  -2.3 93.1 
1999 5.9 35,958  5.8  
2000 9.9 39,585    
 









1996 2.0 37.3 4.8 44.2 
1997 1.8 34.8 4.4 42.0 
1998 3.2 62.7 1.9 18.3 
1999 3.5 69.5 2.2 20.0 






Table 3. Educational Distribution of Singapore Workforce 
25-34 35-44 45-54 Highest 
Qualification 
Attained 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
No Qualification 12.2 4.3 23.9 9.7 49.7 19.8 
Primary 31.2 14.1 35.2 27.1 27.4 32.7 
Secondary 36.9 25.7 26.3 30.9 13.6 26.1 
Upper Secondary 7.6 20.6 7.0 15.1 4.6 12.5 
Polytechnic 4.9 10.9 2.4 4.7 1.2 2.1 
University 7.2 24.4 5.2 12.4 3.5 6.7 
 
 
Table 4. Average Annual Growth Rate of Graduates from Different Institutions, 1988-
1998. 
  
Institutions Average Annual Growth 
Rates, 1988-1998 





SDF training Places 5.6% 
           Note: ITE enrolment decreased from 14995 graduates in 1993 to a low of 











 Table 5. Rankings on HR dimensions in the Competitiveness Reports.  







Report (World Economic 
Forum) 
Efficiency and 
flexibility of labor 
markets 
1 1 1 
World Competitiveness 
Yearbook (International 
Institute for Management 
Development) 
Availability and 
qualifications of human 
resources (population 
and labor force 
characteristics, 
unemployment, 
education, quality of 
life, attitudes and 
values) 
1 4 5 
http://www.psb.gov.sg/statistics_faq/statistics/competitiveness.html 
Table 6. Firm Level Training through SDF in Singapore 










34 40 32 40 
Training Places 
per Employee 
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  
Table 7. Turnover Rates in Singapore, 1988-1999  
1988= 3.9 1993=3.2 1994=3.1 
1995=3 1996=2.8 1997=2.7 
1998=2.1 1999=2.2 2000=2.5 








                                                          
1 In fact, it appears established as a model in Southeast Asia, as Malaysia has already adopted 
parts of the Singapore system.  
2 The Global Competitiveness Report (The World Economic Forum, 2000) ranking of countries 
found Singapore to be first in international competitiveness from 1997 to 1999 and second (to the 
U.S.) in 2000. Another competitiveness ranking by The International Institute for Management 
(IMD, 2000) placed Singapore second in World Competitiveness, just behind the U.S. over the 
same three-year period. In the latest Business Environment Risk report (BERI, 1999) Singapore's 
workforce scored highest out of 49 countries in terms of the relative productivity ratio.  Recent 
comparative research on education through the third international math and science study 
(Beaton, 1996) placed Singaporean 13 year olds at the top of all nations in terms of both science 
and math scores. 
3 Yet, as we noted, the mid 1990s witnessed complaints from employers that the education system 
produced competent engineers and technicians, but not creative entrepreneurs and risk takers. 
Although no systematic and reliable  measure of creativity of high school graduates exists,  the 
government has prioritized education reform to increase creativity, through a number of different 
interventions, such as changing the examination structure,  training teachers,  integrating project 
work with classroom learning, and encouraging continuous learning, as we discussed earlier. 
4  Note, however, that the regional economic crisis might have contributed to the low turnover 
rates post-1997. 
5 Behind these basic goals are more detailed action plans that can be found  in the following 
sources: Productivity 2000 Campaign, The Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness, the CSC 
Subcomittee on Manpower and Productivity, The Singapore Economic Development Board’s 
Industry 21 Initiative, the Ministry of Trade and Industry's Economic Vision for the Future, and 
the PSB's action program to sustain long term productivity growth, coupled with the National 
Trade Union Congress's productivity push program. 
6 The “interdependence” factor clearly seems to be present in Singapore. 
7 Though, on the other hand, we also note that Singapore’s population is not much smaller than 
Scandinavian countries with well recognized “national” models. 
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